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Abstract
Despite the United Kingdom (UK) having been regarded as one of the richest hotspots 
for underwater cultural heritage (UCH), its policy and practice regarding its protection has 
displayed some areas of weakness. This paper makes a case to review the legal framework 
and its overall administration in the UK, in order to protect and preserve any remaining 
UCH before it is further lost or damaged. First, we introduce some of the flaws in the UK’s 
legal system protecting UCH, demonstrating how it has led to a considerable loss of cul-
tural heritage and underlining how it is in need of modernisation. This includes discus-
sion of issues raised in a number of recent cases, including the proposed Victory (1744) 
recovery project, the proposed Goodwin Sands dredging licence and various cases relating 
to the illegal recovery of material. We then map out how policy is implemented in prac-
tice and the role played by various institutions involved with its administration, where we 
find a schism between what policy intends and what it is achieving in practice. This takes 
us towards a broader discussion on how legislative reform might look, including a more 
proactive and ambitious approach to the future management and enjoyment of the UK’s 
impressive UCH. Here we argue the need for better engagement at the global and regional 
negotiating table, as well as in favour of adopting a unified and consistent policy which 
aims to be more sustainable, precautionary, proportionate and inclusive.
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Introduction: The Need to Protect the United Kingdom’s Underwater 
Cultural Heritage
The waters around the United Kingdom (UK) are perhaps the world’s richest in terms 
of underwater cultural heritage (UCH). As an island nation, with thousands of years of 
continuous seaborne migration, trade, exploration and warfare, along with a continental 
shelf once traversed by Europe’s early hunter-gatherers, its waters are home to an immense 
archaeological record (Dromgoole 2006a, 313–314; Firth 2011). It is also a nation which 
could fairly regard itself as having been a pioneer in the field of underwater archaeology, 
producing many of the world’s most influential organisations and researchers (Firth 2014, 
18). However, as a result of fragmented legislation which has not kept in line with contem-
porary challenges, or which has traditionally tolerated or incentivised the removal of and 
interference with UCH, large numbers of the heritage assets found in UK waters have since 
been damaged or destroyed (e.g. Tomalin et  al. 2000, 32; Rednap 1990, 23–30; Parham 
et al. 2013, 403–438).
A recent example is provided by the controversial case of Victory (1744), relating to 
an application to the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), by the US-based treasure hunting 
company, Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. (OME), to permit a purportedly archaeologi-
cally-compliant recovery project on the Victory wreck, resting in the English Channel. It 
was clear among many in the archaeology community that OME and the UK government 
were motivated largely by the financial reward available from salvaging the estimated £500 
million worth of gold and silver coins believed to be on board (Joint Nautical Archaeology 
Policy Committee 2010). This is evidenced, for example, by a letter obtained by a Free-
dom of Information request, written from Lord Lingfield, responsible for setting up the 
Maritime Heritage Foundation (MHF) to manage the proposed archaeological project on 
Victory, to the then-Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, expressing his hope that OME are 
successful in salvaging all the gold (Letter from Lord Lingfield 2014).
It appears as if MHF act merely as a charitable proxy for OME, with work undertaken 
for MHF by individuals who also work for OME.1 It eventually required individual mem-
bers of the UK’s archaeology community to take personal risk through a judicial review 
procedure, in order to ensure that the government’s provisional approval was reversed. 
Indeed, prominent within the ‘Rules concerning activities directed at underwater cultural 
heritage’ (“Annexed Rules”), contained in the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 2001)—which the UK government 
has agreed to adopt as standard practice (UK National Commission for UNESCO, 3)—is 
the need for an unambiguous, well-designed, robust and self-funded archaeological project 
plan, which includes a prohibition on the commercial exploitation of recovered materials.
A further concern has been recently raised with regard to the robustness of the UK’s 
marine licencing process. This can be seen in the UK government’s decision to award a 
licence to the Dover Harbour Board (DHB) to dredge up to 3 million tonnes of sand in an 
area known as the Goodwin Sands and widely viewed as a remarkable UCH hotspot and a 
1 Reynolds, R., (2019), ‘Judicial review undertaken for HMS Victory salvage’, Institute of Art & Law, 10 
April 2019, https ://ial.uk.com/judic ial-revie w-under taken -for-hms-victo ry-salva ge/; accessed 25 April 
2019. Review the case at MMO’s Marine Licence Public Register (https ://marin elice nsing .marin emana 
gemen t.org.uk), case reference: MLA/2014/00597, accessed 4 June 2019.
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proposed Marine Conservation Area.2 A look in detail at the Consent Decision Report pub-
lished with the award given by the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) in July 2018 
(MMO 2018), as well as the supporting Environmental Statements and Written Scheme of 
Investigation submitted by DHB (Dover Harbour Board 2016a, b, c, 2017), demonstrates 
that the environmental impact assessment procedure resembles a relatively unidirectional 
process, where predominant value is given to the evidence and arguments compiled by the 
licence applicant and their selected expert consultants.
A more effective planning system should clearly empower a heritage champion whose 
role is to provide a robust counter-perspective, ensuring that the licencing decision is sub-
ject to robust scientific scrutiny and thoroughly engages with wider social and ecological 
concerns. In the UK, this counter-view is intended to be provided by the Government’s 
appointed heritage advisor, Historic England (or devolved equivalents in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland). However, the Goodwin Sands case has perhaps demonstrated some 
of the limitations that come from relying on a government-appointed advisor, whose pow-
ers are not clearly defined, to the constrain the same government in the attainment of 
national economic objectives. For example, despite their utility in contemporary archae-
ological survey work and the clear cultural significance of the Goodwin Sands, Historic 
England were content to dispense with magnetometer surveys during the heritage impact 
assessment process in 2015.3 This delivered a result of just six features representing surface 
expressions across a 4 km2 area (such expressions proud of the surface are often referred to 
as ‘anomalies’). However, following considerable public pressure, Historic England were 
finally forced to require a magnetometer survey from the developer in 2017, delivering a 
result of 315 anomalies across the same area (MMO 2018, 19; Dover Harbour Board 2017, 
31–32).
Nevertheless, the proposed mitigation strategies for the remaining 29 anomalies in the 
selected dredge zone were felt to be satisfactory by the heritage advisors and the licence 
was awarded in 2018. This was despite some remaining public anxiety about the proposed 
dredging and a concern in the local community about impacts on the cultural and ecologi-
cal value of the Goodwin Sands.4 For example, while DHB have agreed to create a 25-m 
‘Archaeological Exclusion Zone’ around the remaining anomalies of ‘uncertain origin of 
potential archaeological interest’, there are widely held concerns that this may not be a 
sufficient distance, given the difficulty of accurately identifying dispersed fields of archaeo-
logical materials or human remains using current geophysical survey technology. There are 
also questions remaining about the impact on the local seal habitat; the impact of removing 
2.5 million cubic metres of sand at a 2-m dredge depth on important benthic ecosystems; 
2 See Goodwin Sands SOS (www.goodw insan dssos .org; accessed 4 June 2019); ThePipeline, ‘Legal Chal-
lenge Under Consideration as MMO Grant Goodwin Sands Dredging Licence’, 27 July 2018, http://thepi 
pelin e.info/blog/2018/07/27/legal -chall enge-under -consi derat ion-as-mmo-grant -goodw ins-sands -dredg 
ing-licen ce; accessed 4 June 2019; The Pipeline, ‘Goodwin Sands Row: MMO Director of Licensing Held 
Unminuted Meeting with Port of Dover CEO’, 30 January 2018, http://thepi pelin e.info/blog/2018/01/30/
goodw in-sands -row-mmo-direc tor-of-licen sing-held-unmin uted-meeti ng-with-port-of-dover -ceo/; accessed 
4 June 2019.
3 Magnetometer surveys detect the aberrations in the earth’s magnetic field caused by ferrous material. 
Unlike multi beam bathymetry and side scan sonar (which only detect anomalies with a surface expression), 
magnetometers can detect material buried under the surface of the seabed.
4 See The Times, ‘Sandbank dredging angers conservationists’, 28 July 2018, www.theti mes.co.uk/artic 
le/sandb ank-dredg ing-anger s-conse rvati onist s-gg7hm qnwd; accessed 4 June 2019; BBC News, ‘Goodwin 
Sands dredging plans ’disgusting’’, 26 July 2018, https ://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-engla nd-kent-44971 642; 
accessed 4 June 2019.
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the loss of land defences from rising seas; and about the lack of detailed appraisal of alter-
native sites, such as the area known as ‘Area 501’, in the Outer Thames Estuary.
Legislation in the UK has also found it difficult to effectively police illegal recovery or 
souvenir hunting, which is as much a challenge in the UK as elsewhere around the world. 
Indeed, it is possible to locate evidence of much of the destruction in the UK, by examin-
ing the present status of many of the wreck sites found in its shallow waters.5 The issue is 
perhaps most clearly evidenced by the fact that when the UK Receiver of Wreck (ROW) 
offered a 3-month amnesty in 2001, agreeing to refrain from any prosecutions after any 
unreported objects illicitly removed from UK wreck sites were brought forward, it received 
notification of over 30,000 objects which had been illegally retrieved and not reported by 
divers (Dromgoole 2006a, 320). Yet, as human activity increases in the offshore environ-
ment and as the technology for accessing the seabed and excavation becomes increasingly 
affordable and available, the heritage assets in the UK’s offshore region (between 12-nauti-
cal miles to the outer limit of the UK’s exclusive economic zone at 200-nautical miles) are 
now also facing a similar threat of interference. It is therefore vital that action is taken to 
significantly strengthen the UK’s policy across all of these areas, before further heritage is 
lost or damaged.
This paper will highlight and explain some of the weaknesses which remain in the UK’s 
legal system regulating the protection and enjoyment of UCH and then will make aspiring 
recommendations for areas of potential reform. Section 2 introduces the legal context for 
UCH protection in the UK, highlighting some key areas where the law has displayed weak-
ness, such as through the application of commercial salvage to archaeological sites and 
objects, as well as relying heavily on the prior identification and designation of the most 
significant sites of archaeological or historical interest. Section 3 goes further by explor-
ing how government policy is translated into practice and exploring the weaknesses in the 
actual administration of UCH protection, such as the lack of investment in its protection 
and enjoyment, the lack of a heritage champion promoting the values of UCH protection, 
and the need for a greater commitment to archaeological practices and values within the 
governance framework.
Sections 4 and 5 then proceed to examine the possible ways forward. Section 4 explores 
ideas for a more coherent and consistent policy, leading from the front in global and 
regional relations, and utilising the public values obtained by protecting UCH. Section 5 
argues that numerous environmental principles—such as sustainable development, precau-
tionary management and public participation—should be meaningfully enshrined within 
broader UK heritage policy. Section  6 then finally concludes, arguing that a case exists 
for a considerable review and overhaul of existing legislation. Given the lack of funding 
for recording and protecting the UK’s submerged cultural record (see Sect. 3), there is an 
unfortunate lack of empirical evidence on which to base much of the following analysis. As 
a result, some arguments in this paper have had to rely in places upon the personal experi-
ences of the authors, personal communications with experts and stakeholders across the 
field, as well as various other forms of undocumented evidence where necessary.
5 A perusal of the www.wreck site.eu website (accessed 4 June 2019), for example, would demonstrate the 
present status of wrecks around the British Isles after decades of unregulated diving and trophy hunting. 
See, e.g., www.wreck site.eu/check list.aspx (accessed 4 June 2019) for the site’s suggested equipment list 
which leaves no doubt as to the widely adopted practices of some sectors of the marine community. For an 
illustration of pro-salvage and anti-preservationist attitudes remaining among a number of people in the UK 
diving community, see also the ‘Spidge Diver Magazine’ Facebook page (http://www.faceb ook.com/Spidg 
eDive rMaga zine; accessed 4 June 2019).
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Weaknesses in the Law Protecting the United Kingdom’s Underwater 
Cultural Heritage
(a) The International Legal Context
It is beyond the purview of the present paper to give a detailed legislative history on the 
national, regional and international legal rules protecting UCH.6 However, a basic intro-
duction to the legal context shall be provided. It is relatively well-known that, at the inter-
national level, as with global environmental law more generally, it has been challenging 
to produce effective treaties which can curtail national economic development and drive 
forward UCH protection among states. For example, the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (United Nations 1982), hereafter ‘UNCLOS’, was drafted during a period immediately 
prior to considerable improvements in diving technology and before the threats to sub-
merged archaeology were widely appreciated or understood. As such, UCH was only dealt 
with hastily and unsatisfactorily in the final text, in just two of its 320 articles and nine 
annexes: Articles 149 and 303. Apart from appearing to expand coastal state jurisdiction 
over UCH outwards to the contiguous zone (up to 24-nautical miles),7 Article 303’s only 
real achievement was perhaps in producing a merely ‘hortatory’ (Blumberg 2005) agree-
ment that states had a ‘duty to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature 
found at sea and [to] cooperate for this purpose.’8 Article 149 was also severely limited, in 
that only applied to rare UCH found on the deep seabed.
This failure of the UNCLOS to address mounting threats to UCH, beyond good faith 
statements of intent, meant that it fell particularly to national and regional regulation to pro-
vide crucial UCH protection. An important legal instrument in this regard in the European 
context has been the 1992 European Convention on the Protection of Archaeological Herit-
age (Council of Europe 1992), hereafter ‘Valletta Convention’, which has driven forward 
standards of in situ management and preservation for archaeological heritage.9 However, 
the Valletta Convention was quite limited by its focus on archaeological site management, 
as well as its arguable application to just the territorial seas of states parties (up to 12-nau-
tical miles). As a result, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO) commenced negotiations on a new international treaty in the late 1990s, 
culminating in the signature in 2001 of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 2001), hereafter ‘UNESCO Convention’, which 
came into force in 2009. Better reviews of the UNESCO Convention have been carried out 
elsewhere (e.g. Garabello and Scovazzi 2003; Dromgoole 2013; O’Keefe 2014). However, 
it is reasonable to conclude that certain aspects of the UNESCO Convention struggled to 
go much further than existing international practice, such as by merely reinforcing existing 
agreements on in situ preservation as a first option, moving UCH further away from com-
mercial exploitation, and creating an arguably complex system of cooperation for states to 
come together in the protection of UCH.
6 For such an overview, looking particularly at the public and private international level, we recommend 
Dromgoole 2013.
7 Ibid, Article 303(2).
8 Ibid, Article 303(1).
9 Ibid, Arts. 4(ii) and 5(iv).
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For a number of reasons (see Sect. 4), the UK was among a number of maritime powers 
and flag states who initially rejected the UNESCO Convention and refused to ratify. Over 
time, however, various European flag states of particular significance have either joined the 
treaty, e.g. Croatia (2004), Spain (2005), Portugal (2006), Italy (2010), France (2013), or 
appear imminently likely to join, e.g. Netherlands, Germany and the Republic of Ireland. 
Following the Convention, however, a large number of states, including the UK, were con-
tent to adopt the Annexed Rules (UNESCO 2001; DCMS 2005, 2014) in the alternative. 
Drafted by archaeologists, these rules provide an important level of detail in the manner 
and means by which identified UCH sites should be managed or recovered in accordance 
with archaeological best practice. However, they are limited to activities ‘directed at’ UCH 
sites, i.e., recovery plans, archaeological studies or salvage agreements. The result is that 
many of the laws protecting and managing UCH around the world are still predominantly 
driven forward by national and regional policy; the effectiveness of which varies consider-
ably across different states and systems.
(b) The Law Protecting Underwater Cultural Heritage in the United Kingdom
A high-level policy document, Our seas—a shared resource: High level marine objec-
tives (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 2009), gives the impres-
sion that UCH is taken very seriously by the UK government. It contains phrases such 
as ‘[t]here will be appropriate protection for, and access to, our marine heritage assets’ 
(Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 2009, 5) and ‘[p]eople appreciate 
the diversity of the marine environment, its seascapes, its natural and cultural heritage and 
its resources and act responsibly’ (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
2009, 6). This appears to suggest that the tools for protecting the UK’s rich maritime herit-
age assets will be at hand and properly administrated and resourced. However, as has been 
alluded to by policy experts for many years (e.g. Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Com-
mittee 1989, 2000; English Heritage 2004), the UK arguably possesses the unusual record 
of being a world leader in the discipline of underwater archaeology, while at the same time 
failing to benefit from its potentially vast submerged cultural resource. Indeed, as Parham 
once put it, the UK’s policy for UCH could perhaps be viewed as ‘active neglect’ (Gribble 
et al. 2009, 23). Many of the most important laws in the UK—such as those contained in 
the Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 (PWA), Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas 
Act 1979 (AMAA), Merchant Shipping Act 1994 (MSA), Protection of Military Remains 
Act 1986 (PMRA), and the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (MCAA)—are therefore 
in need of considerable reform.
For example, by specifically focusing on the long-term protection of submerged wrecks, 
the PWA is meant to be a key part of the legislative framework. However, as with the 
AMAA and PMRA, it received Royal Asset several decades ago, long before the mod-
ern technical challenges of protecting UCH were properly understood. Furthermore, this 
legislation was only ever intended to a temporary ‘stop-gap’ while more effective UCH 
protection measures could be developed (Firth 2014, 2). Indeed, some of its key weak-
nesses include: a focus upon narrow threats to UCH; a lack of provision for long-term 
conservation of sites; an inclusive approach to salvage; as well as a pre-eminent focus on 
prior identification and designation of sites of significant historical interest, leaving other 
sites with no protection (House of Lords 2001). Its definition of heritage also only focuses 
on “shipwrecks”, thus neglecting many wider forms of UCH sites and objects, as well as 
being limited to the territorial sea (up to 12-nautical miles) around the UK. For example, 
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the equivalent Act to the PWA in Australia—the Historic Shipwrecks Act 197610—was 
already regarded as more effective to the UK’s Act in a number of areas, including a clearer 
and wider definition of UCH, as well as the utilisation of a blanket-based cover for non-
designated sites (see subsection (d)). Even still, however, Australia also recently benefited 
from a complete overhaul and period of modernisation of its more refined UCH laws, cul-
minating in Australia’s Underwater Cultural Heritage Act 2018.11 This is just one example 
of where the UK, who should be at the forefront of policy developments in this field, have 
been thoroughly left behind.
The remainder of this paper will therefore explore various weaknesses with laws, policy 
and practice in the protection of UCH in the UK. For example, two particular concerns 
explored in the remainder of this section are: the remaining legacy of a commercial sal-
vage regime which still inappropriately views submerged sites and artefacts, whether con-
sciously or unconsciously, as objects of commercial reward; as well as the predominant 
focus on protecting only those pre-selected sites designated as of special and particular 
significance. The section that then follows looks at some of the weaknesses inherent in the 
actual administration and implementation of government policy.
(b) Outdated Rules on Commercial Salvage
A key issue at the heart of the UK’s legal system appears to be the maintenance of 
a tradition supporting commercial salvage, such that it continues to be inappropriately 
applied to submerged archaeological heritage. Despite many of the world’s major nations 
seeing UCH as outside the purview of commerce and thus the law of salvage—a doctrine 
traditionally providing financial reward for the raising and resale of wrecked vessels and 
cargo—the UK remains a member of a decreasing number of states who suggest that 
archaeological sites can be salvaged for commercial gain (UK UNESCO 2001 Conven-
tion Review Group 2014, 73–75; English Heritage 2004, 7–8). Indeed, even the majority 
of nations joining the 1989 Salvage Convention entered the reservation allowing them to 
remove archaeological heritage from the private law of salvage (Forrest 2009, 371), with 
the UK even being among those entering the reservation. Unfortunately, however, it has yet 
to implement any effective regulation to achieve this protective position.
The UK has long promoted a commercially expansionist view of salvage for perhaps 
two reasons. First, as a one-time maritime superpower, it still possesses a salvage industry 
with a few companies registered and operating from the UK. For example, the International 
Salvage Union is based in London (ISU 2017). However, it is worth noting that most of 
these commercial salvage companies are quite different to the clandestine ‘treasure salvors’ 
who present a more salient threat to UCH. Second, perhaps more importantly and yet less 
recognised, is the historic influence of Cornish wrecking. As is well known, West Country 
‘wreckers’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became increasingly ruthless in their 
hunt for wreck washed up on the shore, by taking to the killing of shipwreck survivors who 
may lay witness to any looting (Pearce 2010). In response, the UK government introduced 
reforms which legally incentivised the salvage of wrecked goods, provided that sailors’ 
lives were prioritised and merely requiring that all gathered goods were reported to the 
ROW (Wiswall 1970, 43–44).
10 Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976, Act No. 190 of 1976 (Australia).
11 Underwater Cultural Heritage Act 2018, Act No. 85 of 2018 (Australia).
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It is important to recognise that the commercial ‘salvage’ of wreck is a concept which 
goes back centuries, even to the ancient Rhodian maritime law from ca. 800 CE (Schoen-
baum 2012, 208). However, professional maritime salvage focusing upon the recovery of 
recently lost vessels and materials is not usually a concern of the archaeology community. 
Rather, what is needed is for the law to distinguish “historic” wreck of archaeological inter-
est and to take it outside of salvage rules, as the UNESCO Convention sought to do by 
only covering UCH which is over 100 years old (UNESCO Convention, Art. 1(1); Forrest 
2009). Furthermore, the law must operate to alter social attitudes which normalise trophy 
hunting or profit-seeking among amateur divers and coastal communities. However, UK 
law and practice appears to even incentivise such activities. This failure to really shift soci-
etal attitudes manifested itself recently, for example, when MSC Napoli beached on the 
South Devon coast and was set upon by hundreds of local scavengers, all citing their legal 
entitlement to rewards for “salvaging” the goods (Lowther et al. 2008).
Two hundred years later, these rules of archaic origin, which are now found in Part IX 
of the MSA, therefore continue to offer potential financial reward to anyone who disturbs 
or dismantles newly discovered archaeological sites and brings artefacts to the notice of 
the ROW. After such a report, the Receiver has the task of seeking out potential owners 
with the Crown possessing title in lieu of a claim. In most cases—given that artefacts are 
entirely separated from their original context, are sometimes over a century old and have 
owners who are unaware of the historic chain of title—owners do not appear (Ransley and 
Satchell 2014, 189–190). The result is that finders of archaeological heritage in the UK 
are often rewarded by the Crown with the full title to their finds or, where the artefact 
is so valuable that it is sold to a public museum, with an award commensurate with its 
value (Dromgoole 2006a, 318–321; English Heritage 2004, 10–11). The tired argument 
that this incentivises the reporting of finds should perhaps now be accepted as misguided, 
given how it is ‘well known that this is as much honoured in the breach as in the obser-
vance’ (Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee 1989, 19). For example, a compara-
tive study by The SHIPS Project for the Plymouth Sound area, assessing actual finds cata-
logued against those that had been reported to the Receiver, suggested that only around 
10% or less of finds recovered are actually reported by divers (pers. comm. Peter Holt).
Given this widespread assimilation of UCH as objects for private collection and reward, 
the removal of archaeological and historical material, both legally and illegally, therefore 
appears to occur frequently. Recent headline cases relaying the looting of SS Cheerful 
(1885), HMS Hermes (1914) and SS Harrovian (1916)12 provide just some examples of 
the real threat of illegal recovery. In terms of the yet more concerning ‘legal’ salvage, it 
is well-known that the ROW receives reports of thousands of historic objects lifted from 
UK waters, a few of which can be found through the Marine Antiquities Scheme,13 and 
which will inevitably become the subject of commercial salvage awards or awarding title 
of the objects to their finders. The majority of salvage is marked as ‘Confidential’ when 
reported to the ROW and there is therefore no requirement for that department to report 
historic finds to the Heritage Agencies nor make information about them publicly avail-
able. As a result, they are effectively lost from the national consciousness. There is also 
concern about the targeting of archaeological sites with considerable quantities of treasure 
12 See supra Note 8; Press Association, ‘Pair jailed for looting shipwreck’, MailOnline, 22 June 2018, https 
://www.daily mail.co.uk/wires /pa/artic le-58755 85/Pair-jaile d-looti ng-shipw reck.html; accessed 25 April 
2019.
13 See http://www.marin efind s.org.uk; accessed 4 June 2019.
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or valuable cargo on board, with a risk of deals being made without public scrutiny and 
without recourse to the Annexed Rules of the UNESCO Convention. For example, as well 
as the previously noted Victory (1744) case,14 another well-known controversy was Sussex 
(1694), where the UK government awarded a treasure salvage contract to OME in 2006 
(Dromgoole 2004). Paradoxically, this occurred at around the same time that the govern-
ment adopted the Annexed Rules as best practice, which contains a prohibition against any 
activities targeting UCH which represent commercial exploitation. Another example is SS 
Gairsoppa (1941), which sank with the loss of 85 lives in 1941. Despite its significance 
and value as a military gravesite, the ship’s cargo of silver was tendered as a salvage oppor-
tunity by the government to OME in 2010, leading to the recovery of an estimated £137 
million worth of silver.15
(c) Reliance on Prior Identification and Designation of Significant Assets
Legislators in the UK have remained consistently in favour of focusing upon listing-
based methods for protecting UCH, as has been commonly adopted for heritage on land. 
This system essentially leaves all sites open to the trophy hunting or private exploitation 
discussed above, save for the few dozen wrecks which are assessed as possessing such 
archaeological importance to be designated protected sites under the PWA, or the few 
dozen listed as protected places under the PMRA, or those very few sites, particularly in 
the coastal and intertidal region, listed under the AMAA.16 There are various difficulties 
with such a listing-based approach (Henderson 2001; Firth 2011). For example, the lack 
of protection for the thousands of unlisted and as yet unknown or poorly understood sites 
of interest; the inability to effectively and accurately assess site significance; the likelihood 
that sites are looted or damaged before designation; as well as the disproportionate assign-
ment of resources to just a few sites while others receive no protection.
Elsewhere, by contrast, several countries have been arguably more successful by operat-
ing a blanket-based method of protection which regulates all activities of any nature which 
might incidentally impact the national cultural record (see generally, Dromgoole 2006b). 
Such systems can still include a listing mechanism to protect sites of most significant 
archaeological or historic interest (e.g. Protection of Shipwrecks Act 1976 (Australia), s. 7; 
and National Monuments Amendment Act, 1987 (Ireland), s. 3). This has proved effective 
in similar jurisdictions (UNESCO 1997, Annex I, para. 12) and has not, despite previous 
suggestions (e.g. English Heritage 2004, 153–154), required significant investment in addi-
tional monitoring and enforcement resources. Scotland did recently improve upon the UK’s 
extant listing-based system. However, the development of Historic Marine Protected Areas 
under the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010 formed simply another system of prior scheduling of 
only those assets considered to be of ‘national importance’.17
In terms of UK terrestrial heritage, a listing-based approach has worked well. However, 
this is likely to be because of comprehensive underlying domestic law which protects all 
14 See several articles available at www.thepi pelin e.info; accessed 25 April 2019.
15 Davies, L., ‘Atlantic wreck set to yield £150 m haul’, The Guardian, 26 September 2011, https ://www.
thegu ardia n.com/world /2011/sep/26/atlan tic-wreck -150m-silve r-gairs oppa; accessed 25 April 2019.
16 Although the latter has many benefits, such as making listing easier and promoting a ‘look but don’t 
touch’ attitude toward those listed sites (Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee 2003, 18), it has 
only been used for a few Welsh and Scottish sub-tidal sites.
17 Marine (Scotland) Act 2010, Section 73(1).
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the thousands of other unlisted sites and monuments on land from disturbance, damage or 
theft, including well-developed planning laws, property laws and laws against trespass and 
vandalism (Dromgoole 1989, 114). In the marine environment, however, the underlying 
legal framework is still founded on the MSA and its historic mechanism for incentivis-
ing removal, interference or reward-hunting. Crucially, therefore, the MCAA was passed 
in 2009 and the Marine (Scotland) Act in 2010, which both finally create an underlying 
protection for unlisted UCH from incidental activities by imposing stricter marine licens-
ing rules. This has been very important in providing the coveted activity-based protection, 
placing a requirement upon marine operators to obtain a licence from the MMO before 
engaging in certain threatening activities up to 200-nautical miles from the coast, including 
laying pipes and cables, dredging, building installations, or lifting objects from the seabed 
with the use of a vessel.
Putting aside questions about whether this development contradicts the UK’s own previ-
ous position with regard to ‘creeping jurisdiction’ of coastal states over UCH in the EEZ/
continental shelf (on this concern, see Dromgoole 2006a, 342; UK UNESCO 2001 Con-
vention Review Group 2014, 36–38), the MCAA and Marine (Scotland) Act only cover 
formal salvage operations which are undertaken with the use of a vessel. However, lifting 
objects by hand is still open to the rules on obtaining commercial rewards. What is more, 
when determining whether to allow offshore operators to demolish or remove UCH which 
is in the way of their operations, the MMO when determining licences to remove UCH 
are surely mindful that, upon lifting the UCH to the surface, operators would be entitled 
to bring it back to shore and claim a generous award (or even claim title where outside ter-
ritorial waters—see Sect. 4). Decision-makers, such as the MMO, are therefore unlikely to 
‘value’ the UCH in situ, as demanded by international standards, and are likely to be under 
greater pressure to view UCH as merely an obstacle to development or as artefacts to be 
salvaged. Furthermore, as explored further below, there are questions about the rules and 
systems which the MMO rely on to carry out licensing assessments, as well as the avail-
able expertise to champion cultural and natural heritage protection in the decision-making 
process.
That said, recent court cases provide evidence that the MCAA has considerably 
improved the regulatory landscape, by at last giving the courts something with which to 
penalise unsanctioned recovery of important, but unlisted, UCH.18 Northern Ireland has 
slightly improved the situation, by introducing further additional activity-based controls 
which require anyone to report discoveries of new archaeological materials in NI’s territo-
rial waters, as well as prohibiting the search for archaeological materials with the use of 
detecting devices or by excavation of land without obtaining a prior licence.19 Yet again, 
however, there is still a lack of reliable activity-based regulation which can pre-empt inad-
vertent or incidental damage to UCH.
(d) Self-Imposed Jurisdictional Limitations
18 Marine Management Organisation, ‘Man found guilty of marine licensing offences relating to salvage 
of shipwreck’, 23 May 2016, https ://www.gov.uk/gover nment /news/man-found -guilt y-of-marin e-licen sing-
offen ces-relat ing-to-salva ge-of-shipw reck; accessed 20 April 2018; Marine Management Organisation, 
‘Master and owner charged for illegal salvage of sunken vessel’, 7 August 2018, https://www.gov.uk/gover 
nment /news/maste r-and-owner -charg ed-for-illeg al-salva ge-of-sunke n-vesse l; accessed 20 April 2018.
19 Historic Monuments and Archaeological Objects (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Sections 29, 41 and 42.
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The legislation in the UK has focused too much on regulating the ownership of UCH 
found in the territorial seas (up to 12 nautical miles), but has yet to provide any effective 
legal mechanism for the protection of UCH within the additional contiguous zone permit-
ted for UCH regulation (between 12 and 24 nautical miles) or upon its Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf (up to 200 nautical miles). This is compounded by the 
judgment in Pierce v. Bemis (1986),20 which provides that any unclaimed UCH brought 
into the UK territory shall be res nullius and open to appropriation by its importer.
Similarly, while heritage agencies provide general advice relating to matters beyond 
the 12-mile territorial sea limit to government departments, such as the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), MOD and MMO (and any devolved equivalents in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), their remit in terms of heritage protection strategy 
exclusively focuses on UCH assets within the 12-mile limit. This demarcation of responsi-
bility does not adequately reflect the distribution of significant submerged cultural remains 
across the wider UK marine area. It is true that the UK has been pioneering in the devel-
opment of certain extraterritorial rules protecting military gravesites, such as within the 
PMRA, which can apply to all British flagged vessels and nationals, regardless of locale. 
However, this is a fraction of what could be done to protect UCH around the world fall-
ing under the purview of British jurisdiction, outside of the narrow band of territorial sea, 
which is otherwise quite poorly protected and consistently falls out of the UK’s wider her-
itage strategy.
Weaknesses in the Administration of Policy Protecting the United 
Kingdom’s Underwater Cultural Heritage
(a) A Lack of Investment in our Future
As a major world economy (ranking the second largest in Europe and the fifth largest in 
the world) (CIA 2017), the UK should have reasonable resources at its disposal to secure 
its archaeological and historical cultural heritage. Tourism, much of it revolving around 
the UK’s historic cultural heritage, accounts for £126bn, or 9%, of gross domestic product 
(Historic England 2016a, b). According to a recent study, the heritage sector brings in an 
estimated £29bn annually and investment in heritage drives long-term economic growth 
through tourism, employment, commerce and global services (Historic England 2018). 
These are not insignificant figures and the sector continues to show strong annual growth. 
However, there appears to be little meaningful investment by government to capitalise on 
these statistics when it comes to the UK’s world-class marine heritage. For example, Eng-
lish Heritage, having once been the conservation authority of last resort with a £100  m 
grant aid budget in 2014, is now expected to be self-financing by 2023. Similarly, Historic 
England itself—which once formed a part of English Heritage before they were split in 
2015—has seen a significant cut in funding since the 2007–2008 global recession and will 
be cut a further 10% in real terms over the 4 years from 2016/17 (UK Government 2015).
For the marine environment, the balance of resources afforded to research, protection 
and planning in the tidal and sub-tidal zones appears to be disproportionately low. As an 
20 Pierce v. Bemis 1 QB 401 (1986).
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example, protection of the approximately 50,000 square miles in Historic England’s ter-
restrial remit generates a listing team of around 80 employees, a planning team of around 
320 employees and around 136 researchers. This can be starkly contrasted with the roughly 
21,000 square miles of English territorial waters, where there are merely two employees 
on the listing team, three on the planning team and no dedicated marine researchers at 
all (Historic England 2016a, b). This is especially surprising as the baseline of historic 
environment knowledge is far lower in the marine environment than it is in the terrestrial 
environment. This discrepancy in resourcing UCH protection is seemingly inequitable, 
making it clear that the marine historic environment is under-represented and underval-
ued in government policy. Previously, a large part of the problem has been ensuring that 
the wider public can maximise their enjoyment and utility of distant UCH. However, this 
has improved dramatically and continues to do so, by advancing diving technologies, new 
means of media and digital consumption, an emerging awareness of broader social and 
environmental benefits, and a growing number of options for enjoying and accessing UCH 
in situ by virtual means (Firth 2015, 9).
Looking at other nations, however, it is clear that the historic environment can form an 
important and integrated part of marine policy. For example, Australia uses a system of 
well-resourced state curators, linked with museums who specialise in UCH and have the 
resources to investigate within their areas of operation (Anderson et al. 2006, 141). It is 
also well-known how countries across the Asian peninsula are increasingly turning towards 
the study of UCH and diverting millions of dollars towards its protection and research (e.g. 
Jing and Li 2019). The UK’s closest neighbour, France, which ranks lower than the UK 
in world economic rankings, manages to fund a team that deals exclusively with UCH in 
French waters, including out to the contiguous zone (up to 24-nautical miles). A look at 
the work of France’s Département des recherches archéologiques subaquatiques et sous-
marines (DRASSM 2010) highlights a well-funded, well-equipped and focused team of 
experts dealing with UCH management. It is supported by 37 full-time staff, two research 
vessels, its own laboratory facilities and a library. In contrast, UK heritage agencies have 
endured successive redundancies and resource reductions, with further cuts to come.
Resultantly, there is a perceived lack of regard for heritage issues below the high-water 
mark, with a marked difference of policy and an obvious discrepancy in the way herit-
age assets on land and below water are regarded and protected. For example, of the two 
major excavations of at-risk UCH carried out in UK waters in 2017, the only excavation 
funded by the UK was on HMS Invincible (1758). However, the £2 million used for this 
was funded by the Chancellor of the Exchequer out of receipts from fines imposed follow-
ing a banking scandal and was not the result of any investment from heritage agencies.21 
By contrast, the Dutch Cultural Heritage Agency (Rijksdienst voor het Cultureel Erfgoed) 
spent more than all UK heritage agencies together, putting in £1.7 m into the excavation of 
Rooswijk (1740) off the Goodwin Sands.22
Part of the problem also appears to be the lack of visibility on the social or cultural 
benefits of in situ UCH preservation and enjoyment. Indeed, there are many widely-agreed 
21 HM Treasury, ‘LIBOR fines to be used to support military charities and Royal Voluntary Service’, 12 
July 2016, https ://www.gov.uk/gover nment /news/libor -fines -to-be-used-to-suppo rt-milit ary-chari ties-and-
royal -volun tary-servi ce, accessed 4 June 2019.
22 Milmo, C., ‘300-year-old Dutch bullion ship wrecked off the Kent coast to be subject of £1.7 m excava-
tion’, 21 April 2017, https ://inews .co.uk/news/uk/300-year-old-dutch -bulli on-ship-wreck ed-off-kent-coast 
-subje ct-1-7m-excav ation /, accessed 4 June 2019.
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social, economic, political, educational, recreational and moral arguments which make it 
incumbent upon states to properly protect the marine historic environment for the benefit of 
their citizens and wider humanity (Firth 2015; Hall 2011). However, government strategy 
tends to increasingly prioritise investment into heritage which is more commercially self-
sustaining and which provides a short-term return-on-investment, thus leaving the heritage 
community to compete aggressively over limited sources of finance, such National Lot-
tery funding and private donors. However, a particular difficulty with such a market liberal 
model is that it drives a limited amount of public budget towards promoting or protecting 
the most profitable and ‘obvious’ assets, such as the world-famous Mary Rose, Cutty Sark, 
SS Great Britain and HMS Victory museums,23 while the paying public become increas-
ingly detached from the vast majority of unknown or unresearched assets that receive no 
coverage and public awareness.
The effects of this might be seen as self-enforcing, wherein decreased visibility of lesser 
known sites leads to decreased investment, leading to even less public engagement, thus 
leading to less profitability and investment in such sites (e.g. Gribble, Parham & Scott-
Ireton, 23). However, there is a fair counter-argument that the more popular museum sites 
increase the overall visibility and sense of importance of UCH, particularly if the archaeo-
logical value of such sites is included as an aspect of the museum experience (pers. comm. 
Ulrike Guérin). The difficulty with this contradistinction between varying public concern 
for visible and invisible assets can perhaps be illustrated, however, by the public anxiety 
over the proposed Goodwin Sands dredging, when many other marine landscapes further 
offshore rarely ever capture such public interest and emotion.
(b) A Lack of Heritage Champion
A number of different agencies are implicated in the administration of UCH protection 
in the UK. Policy is principally devised by the government through the DCMS, with some 
aspects falling to other departments, such as the Department for the Environment Farming 
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) or the MOD. The MCAA in 2009 established the MMO as a 
new government body, who have assumed wide-ranging responsibility for marine planning 
in England, with similar non-departmental public bodies in the devolved governments (UK 
Government 2011). Marine Scotland is equivalent of the MMO for the Scottish territorial 
waters and wider marine area, introduced by the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010, and under-
taking a similar role in terms of marine planning and administration of national policy. By 
having regulatory responsibility for the licensing and planning of offshore activities, these 
organisations play a pivotal role in the management and protection of UCH. Finally, and 
just as importantly, heritage agencies (e.g., Historic England, Historic Environment Scot-
land, Cadw in Wales and the Historic Environment Division in Northern Ireland) provide 
technical advice to the government departments and planning regulators in respect of the 
application of policy.
The resulting triumvirate system—between government, administrator and technical 
advisor—has the potential to work well, on the proviso that such agencies are given full 
autonomy and meaningful influence within what is intended to represent a separation of 
23 The HMS Victory Museum houses the later HMS Victory, Nelson’s flagship of Trafalgar fame, which 
sits in a dry dock in Portsmouth. Not to be confused with the second-rate ship of the line and Admiral Bal-
chen’s earlier flagship vessel, Victory (1744), which was built in 1737 and sank in the English Channel in 
1744.
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powers. Policy can be enshrined into high level documents regarding environmental issues 
and these policies trickle down to planning and listing practices. Guidance documents can 
underpin the framework in which planning and designation decisions are made. However, 
there remains uncertainty about the expertise, resources, autonomy and actual power that 
heritage agencies have when heritage is threatened by development or in need of a public 
protector.
Thus, no one in the policy framework is effectively championing UCH protection and its 
in situ enjoyment in the UK. The need for such a champion in the UK’s system of govern-
ance, whose role is to invest public resources and energy into defending and promoting the 
interests of the UK’s remarkable cultural heritage across the wider marine environment, 
has become ever-presently clear as the challenges of achieving effective implementation 
have become increasingly manifest. Indeed, given that responsibility for UCH is increas-
ingly fragmented across a complex panoply of overlapping government departments, it has 
created the perfect environment for regulators to habitually ‘pass the buck’ on their respon-
sibilities (pers. comm. Peter Marsden). Remarkably, all of this is despite the fact that some 
of the world’s leading NGOs and private organisations championing the international pro-
tection of UCH, such as the Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee (JNAPC) and 
the Nautical Archaeology Society (NAS), are based in the UK.
The UK also possesses vague, hortatory planning policies which, although they some-
times refer to a need to consider UCH in any planned marine activity across the 200-nauti-
cal mile zone, do not provide any firm rules by which the UCH should be valued or under 
which a failure to consider its interests can be enforced (e.g. UK Government  2011, s. 
2.6.6). Instead, therefore, much of the marine planning legislation in the UK relies upon 
legally non-binding and recommendatory rules (so-called ‘soft law’), such as industry pro-
tocols and codes of conduct, to uphold the broader public interest in protecting the historic 
environment (e.g. Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee 2006; The Crown Estate 
2010). While such soft law provides flexibility and better technical interoperability, the 
lack of legal firmness in the most important rules contained within them also weakens the 
capacity of any agency or public protector to enforce or implement such protection.
The lack of heritage champion also means that there is no public enforcer, who can 
campaign to dedicate resources towards the detection, investigation and prosecution of 
marine heritage crime. It is known that clandestine recovery of submerged cultural sites 
has increased with the development of diving technology. Some war graves subject to UK 
ownership and jurisdictional immunity have been increasingly subject to looting which has 
gone unchallenged. For example, it has been observed that 65% of the sovereign immune 
British and German Battle of Jutland wrecks have been targeted for their condenser units 
and propellers and that the rate of metal theft from them has increased substantially in 
the last 15 years (McCartney 2017, 196–204). Yet, even though HMS Queen Mary (1916) 
was salvaged over a period of time when the Dutch-owned perpetrators were known to the 
authorities, little action has been taken until recently, after significant public pressure was 
mounted on the MOD and other responsible agencies.24 
24 See The PipeLine, ‘Exclusive: Named—The Salvage Company Which Looted Jutland War Graves as 
MOD Fails to Act’, 22 May 2016, https ://thepi pelin e.info/blog/2016/05/22/exclu sive-named -the-salva ge-
compa ny-which -loote d-jutla nd-war-grave s-as-mod-fails -to-act/, accessed 4 June 2019; Booth, R., ‘Battle 
of Jutland war graves ’vandalised’ by illegal metal scavengers’, 18 September 2016, The Guardian, https 
://www.thegu ardia n.com/world /2016/sep/18/battl e-jutla nd-war-grave s-hms-warri or-metal -scave ngers -royal 
-navy; accessed 4 June 2019.
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(c) A Lack of Archaeological Focus and Proficiency in Decision-making
The regulatory framework for dealing with UCH in the course of marine develop-
ments has, in contrast with terrestrial equivalents, not moved the understanding of the 
marine historic environment forward a great deal since the 1990s. This is because in a 
marine setting, there is often the option—due to a lack of constraints—to simply avoid 
any potential heritage asset, despite a higher level of ‘intangible’ impact (where impacts 
are too ephemeral, subjective or distal to measure, but cumulatively may be significant). 
No offsetting of intangible impact is required by the regulator and remedial mitigation 
is rarely required where impacts have been evidenced. In addition, in an attempt to be 
proportionate and avoid incurring what would be considered disproportionate costs to 
the developer, a generally far lower level of ‘sampling’ or ‘groundtruthing’ of anomalies 
and potential UCH is adopted in marine work than would be acceptable in an equivalent 
terrestrial development project, where between 1 and 5% evaluative (intrusive) sampling 
is the norm on sites, averaging around 2.5% by area (Wilkins 2012, 59). Referring back 
to the case of the Goodwin Sands, for example, more groundtruthing would likely have 
improved understanding about potential archaeological anomalies and the design of mit-
igation strategies (3H Consulting 2018), as well as help to assuage public anxiety about 
the potential risks.
As an industry, therefore, marine archaeological consultancy has not significantly 
improved its understanding of how best to discriminate anomalies and potential UCH 
during work for offshore developers. Nor has it significantly strengthened and con-
solidated its understanding of the marine environment and disseminated it to a wider 
business, research and public audience. Until there are senior, marine-specific, policy-
level roles within the relevant government departments and within the heritage agen-
cies, employing persons equipped with the experience and actual technical knowledge 
of the challenges facing UCH, it is difficult to see the situation improving. Furthermore, 
policymakers have been limited in their ability to understand and assess impacts on and 
changes to the marine historic environment in UK waters, meaning that they are forced 
to rely on third parties with expertise in marine geophysics and UCH assessment and 
management to support their own understanding. This is probably a cost-effective model 
to adopt, but the flip-side is the danger that policymaking bodies may accumulate only a 
limited, partial or siloed understanding of the real issues affecting UCH.
Another recent phenomenon affecting the heritage agencies is a shift away from what 
many archaeologists would consider ‘core’ protection activities (such as scheduling), to 
more nebulous performance indicators based around communication and engagement, 
or concepts such as ‘creating impact’ (see for example Heritage Lottery Fund 2017), 
which will inevitably gravitate toward social media and online impact as a default. 
Whilst most heritage professionals would recognise the importance of outreach, engage-
ment and education, it would be difficult to justify the prioritisation of media-led out-
put over tangible heritage protection. Without exception, the heritage agencies include 
‘protection’ as one of their principal aims (Historic England 2017: 5; Historic Environ-
ment Scotland 2016: 8; Cadw 2014: 10; Northern Ireland Environment Agency 2016, 
8). However, there seems to be limited concern about mechanisms for actual protection 
of UCH (such as scheduling or intervention) than there is for engagement, communica-
tion of events and other activities in connection with UCH. The engagement and public 
awareness that this generates is important and beneficial, but it is not alone sufficient to 
provide protection. This can be observed in the reluctance by some heritage agencies to 
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use scheduling below the low water mark, despite there being around 20,000 terrestrial 
scheduled sites in England (DCMS 2010).
Prioritising ‘impact’ would be acceptable if there were not pressing anthropogenic and 
natural threats to UCH, only being reinforced by a salvage law that rewards activities that 
remove UCH in the most archaeologically incompatible way. Indeed, at present, both low-
level deleterious effects caused by amateur salvage and trophy hunters, and salvage opera-
tions by well-organised international salvage outfits, appear to be tolerated by the heritage 
agencies provided that they comply with the UK’s historic salvage law. The damage that 
policies like this have had on the marine historic environment, over the past 40 years or so, 
has been significant (Strati 1995, 12–19; Darrington 2002, 371).
The Need for a More Proactive, Coherent, Ambitious 
and Outward‑Looking Policy
As a nation so rich in UCH and as a leader in underwater archaeology, the UK should 
now focus on becoming a global leader in the effective protection, preservation and public 
enjoyment of in  situ and ex situ UCH. This would include undertaking a complete and 
comprehensive review of the collection of rules protecting UCH, which presently appear 
to be scattered across different statutes, regulations, codes and guidelines, developed over 
several decades. Such a wide-ranging review could be led by the government ministers and 
the Civil Service, including a lengthy public consultation, so as to build expansively upon 
similar legislation mapping efforts undertaken by academics in the past (e.g. English Herit-
age 2004; UK UNESCO 2001 Convention Review Group 2014).
This new legislation could be more ambitious, cutting-edge, driven by practical 
research, and focused on maximising public enjoyment of UCH. It would involve a more 
predictable and consistent system for managing marine licensing, currently only provided 
by one small section of the MCAA 2009 (s. 66) or Marine (Scotland) Act (s. 21). As part 
of this, it would include a detailed set of guidelines and rules, for use by the MMO, as well 
as other government departments, heritage agencies and devolved equivalents, for carrying 
out heritage impact assessments or making decisions with regard to both direct and indirect 
activities surrounding the marine historic environment. New legislation should also finally 
provide for a more joined-up approach across government, with all government depart-
ments more efficiently operating using a shared and centralised UCH strategy, where the 
DCMS and appointed heritage agencies are responsible for ensuring that the correct rules 
and procedures are disseminated, interpreted and enforced consistently across government 
and by the public.
Such leadership could also provide the coveted voice for the heritage itself, providing 
a platform for more effectively and meaningfully incorporating the plurality of views and 
values from the wider community. Naturally, it will need to also incorporate scientific and 
archaeological values into its overall methodology. Such a multivocal and scientifically-
undergirded system would also include a clearly set out multiple-value understanding and 
justification for UCH preservation, where short-term reward-seeking and focus on pri-
vate commercial gain would be extracted from existing policies and practices. Part of this 
championing process might also be the provision of clearer and more structured systems 
of responsibility and accountability, accurately reflecting the custodianship of decision-
makers over multiple heritage values for present and future generations. It would also 
require a tilting of the focus of heritage agencies, away from focusing heavily on impact 
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and engagement, towards a broader and more ambitious set of scientific, economic, social 
and cultural objectives involving UCH.
New legislation would also provide a clearer and more inclusive definition of marine 
heritage, within a wider integrated land-coastal-marine cultural heritage strategy, where all 
forms of UCH sites and objects would be experienced through a predictable and cyclical 
process of protection, preservation and enjoyment. It could establish a more outward-look-
ing and globally-oriented strategy, providing further focus on the many important heritage 
assets found in the UK’s contiguous zone (12–24-nautical miles), the EEZ and continental 
shelf (up to 200-nautical miles), in British Overseas Territories, in other states’ territorial 
waters, in the high seas, and in areas beyond national jurisdiction, such as the polar regions. 
This should also include a widening of the remit of heritage advisors and the DCMS over 
heritage found to the outer edge of the UK’s EEZ, while expanding their role towards the 
actual regulation and development of strategy for the UK’s worldwide heritage far beyond 
the narrow territorial sea. Rules could also be more effectively distributed between hard 
and soft law, to provide optimum enforceability and flexibility, while clearly distinguishing 
between different management options for ex situ and in situ heritage, as well as direct and 
indirect forms of activity.
An outward-looking approach would also recognise growing voices across the UK call-
ing for the ratification of the UNESCO Convention. There is little plausible argument left 
against the ratification of this international treaty which continues to grow its membership 
and influence among many maritime states. As with many other significant objecting states, 
the previous fears of the UK government over the treaty’s treatment of sovereign immune 
wrecks (i.e., warships sunk while on service and receiving special protection under inter-
national law); or its potential to drive coastal state creeping jurisdiction; and the perception 
that the instrument requires the fullest protection of every potential wreck in UK territorial 
waters; have each now been shown to fall short of reality (e.g. UK UNESCO 2001 Conven-
tion Review Group 2014; González et al. 2009, 57; Roberts 2018). Furthermore, the Con-
vention’s definition of UCH falling within its purview—being objects of an archaeological 
character having been submerged for 100 years or more—leaves many modern-day wrecks 
which could maintain a commercial salvage industry (UNESCO 1997, Add. 1 and 5), of 
course excepting significant sites such as World War II wrecks.
Instead, the treaty would stimulate marine heritage legal reform in the UK by promot-
ing the in situ preservation and non-commercialisation of UCH in territorial waters and in 
areas beyond, as well as particularly strengthening the international protection of all British 
wrecks found in maritime zones around the world (Dromgoole 2011). States could feasibly 
still hold an influential and effective global strategy outside of the UNESCO treaty frame-
work (pers. comm. Mike Williams). For example, the Netherlands have signed numerous 
strategic Memoranda of Understanding with coastal states representing former colonies 
throughout the world, operating in the shadow of the Convention (Maarleveld 2006, 183). 
However, doing this through the UNESCO treaty framework would serve to raise baseline 
standards, bring stronger commitments into harder legal form, impose stronger expecta-
tions and projected limitations upon both flag and coastal states, and provide a suitable 
platform for establishing cooperative relations between all states and non-state actors. 
Indeed, this is one of the key reasons why the Netherlands and Germany are now join-
ing the treaty, as well as why other former flag powers having already signed up, such as 
France, Spain and Portugal (pers. comm. Martijn Manders). However, in October 2017, 
much to the distress of the marine heritage community, the UK government announced 
its decision to indefinitely defer its recent promise to review the UK’s non-ratification 
of the Convention (UK Parliament 2017). Given the stark findings of this paper, as well 
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as the findings of the UK UNESCO Policy Brief and the UNESCO Convention Impact 
Review—which both effectively defended the Convention in the context of UK objections 
(UK National Commission for UNESCO 2015; UK UNESCO 2001 Convention Review 
Group 2014)—this decision is regrettable.
Nevertheless, a more outward-looking and global approach can and should also embrace 
the important potential and role of many other forms of bilateral and regional agreements, 
which would significantly strengthen the international protection of British heritage in 
key regions throughout the world, such across European seas, as well as in the Ameri-
cas, Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and the polar regions. Such transnational and multilateral 
frameworks should provide equally effective platforms for collaboration, resource-pooling, 
standard-raising, and sharing of best practices, while also driving forward wider member-
ship and active participation in global regimes such as the UNESCO Convention frame-
work. Indeed, Article 303(4) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and Article 
6 of the UNESCO Convention both place an expectation on states that they will create 
and implement further regional agreements that may provide for ‘better protection’ than 
is possible by an international treaty between nearly 200 negotiating interests. Finally, a 
more transparent, holistic and long-term investment strategy would also properly capital-
ise on the multiple and long-term social, economic and cultural values available from the 
UK’s larger marine heritage industry, by providing more public finance to free up the wider 
potential for heritage tourism, jobs and industry. This all feeds perfectly into the UK’s 
emerging global soft power strategy, by capitalising on the UK’s extant global reputation 
and influence as a maritime superpower (pers. comm. Robert Yorke).
The Need for a Sustainable, Precautionary, Inclusive, Transparent 
and Proportionate Policy
It is not just the underlying policy which needs reform, but the overall attitude and approach 
towards the preservation and management of UCH. With the widespread adoption of the 
annexed Rules to the UNESCO Convention as best practice for activities directed at UCH, 
it appears that many states are aligning themselves with an international movement to rec-
ognise the public value and social fulfilment available by enjoying and appropriately expe-
riencing submerged cultural heritage, both in situ and ex situ. The UNESCO Convention 
itself acknowledges ‘the importance of underwater cultural heritage as an integral part of 
the cultural heritage of humanity’ and calls upon states to preserve UCH ‘for the benefit of 
humanity’ (UNESCO 2001, Preamble and Art. 2(3)). It is reasonable to assume, therefore, 
that UCH forms what has increasingly been referred to as a ‘common concern of human-
kind’. This principle has been increasingly linked to international treaty regimes—such 
as relating to cultural heritage, the environment, or human rights—which emphasise the 
universality, intra-generationality and inter-generationality of the global public goods in 
question and the need for meaningful international accountability (Weiss 2015). Indeed, 
previous commentary has expressed the need to adopt a ‘multiple-use’ perspective of UCH 
(Nafziger 1999; Varmer 1999; Fletcher-Tomenius and Forrest 2000), which also lends itself 
further to the suggestion that UCH should be preserved as a globally reusable and sustain-
able resource for long-term research, education, tourism, community value and enjoyment.
Understandably, in the alternative, all marine policy decisions taken by the UK 
need to take into account the social and economic interests of its own citizens. There 
will therefore always be competing interests which will need to be considered, such 
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as the cost borne to the taxpayer by investing in UCH protection and management, or 
the opportunity-cost from prohibiting commercial salvage or offshore mining, fish-
ing, dredging or development (Flatman 2007, 144; Evans et al. 2009). One of the most 
germane trade-offs is between the socioeconomic gains made by increasing renewable 
energy production by the development of large offshore wind farms and power grids, 
balanced against the potential proximate cultural and environmental damage caused by 
such activity (e.g. Flatman 2012). As such, all decisions relating to the protection and 
long-term management of UCH therefore also need to be proportionate and to recognise 
the multiple ‘values’ in different options.
Yet, while legislation has introduced a broad duty to consider interests of the historic 
environment in any offshore activity, it remains unclear how such a commitment is to be 
carried out or the means by which decision-making can be monitored or scrutinised by the 
‘concerned humankind’. As noted above, most of the offshore management of UCH dur-
ing economic activity is based on advisory and ‘soft law’ protocols and codes of conduct. 
Furthermore, the public has little reliable information on how national heritage agencies 
charged with responsibility for deciding on the potential cultural impact carry out their 
responsibilities. It is certainly discernible that those nations which protect UCH with 
greater enthusiasm and resources, such as Italy, South Africa, France, Greece and China 
(see e.g. Dromgoole 2006b), inherently treat and interpret UCH as a valuable resource in 
which the whole public have an engaged interest and sense of cultural pride and owner-
ship. By contrast, in those states which view UCH as a hobby for niche recreational, aca-
demic and commercial interests, such as the UK and United States, the public appear to 
view UCH in economic terms—whether as a pathway or an obstacle to economic advance-
ment—and have little sense of communal ownership or cultural enjoyment.
Viewing UCH as a common concern of humankind would require it to be governed in 
the future with less of an exclusive focus on national economic advancement. This would 
interpose a number of additional environmental and general principles, such as sustain-
able development, precautionary management, polluter pays principle, public participation, 
transparency, and intergenerational and intragenerational equity. However, while such well-
meaning principles are too often cited in government strategy documents, policy white 
papers, and heritage objectives; whenever the choice between prioritising the social inter-
ests of future generations or the economic interests of the present generation are faced off, 
short-termism always appears to prevail. It is unfortunately beyond the remit of this study 
to address all these principles and explore their application in detail, but some examples 
might suffice.
For example, the fact that policy too often prioritises economic advancement over con-
cerns for the natural and cultural environment demonstrates a misunderstanding of the very 
purpose and meaning of “sustainable development”. Commonly referred to as ‘develop-
ment that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gen-
erations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment and Development 
1987), sustainable development has come to be preferably viewed as a requirement that 
ecological and social (including cultural) concerns should be promoted to each carry as 
much weight as economic concerns; thus, ensuring strategies are all equally distributed 
across the social, ecological and economic domains (Slaper and Hall 2011; Flint 2013, 
27–37). However, too often it is treated in a generalised manner by legislation and practice, 
with little meaningful observance or normative interpretation. The result is that govern-
ments often say they are acting ‘sustainably’ by focusing on economic growth, in a manner 
that demonstrates that they have merely considered the interests of the social and ecologi-
cal vectors.
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This same contamination can be found across the other guiding principles for sound 
long-term environmental protection. A vivid example can be witnessed than in the case 
of “precautionary management”, which is continuously referred to by UK agencies and is 
often found at the heart of existing strategic and decision-making guides. For example, the 
UK’s Marine Policy Statement (UK Government 2011)—which at Section 2.6.6 commits 
to protecting the UK’s marine historic environment—declares that decision-makers will 
‘need to apply precaution with an overall risk-based approach, in accordance with the sus-
tainable development policies of the UK Administrations’ (Section 2.3.1.2). This includes 
the need to ‘ensure that appropriate weight is attached’ to considerations such as desig-
nations, public concerns and conservation interests. Although the precise definition and 
meaning of “precautionary management” has shifted over the years (Manson 2002; Stewart 
2002), it would be difficult to argue that policy and practice in the UK has kept up with the 
definitions preferred by the concerned humankind. For example, the Marine Policy State-
ment and the MCAA appear to have understood such precautionary management as merely 
the undertaking of proportionate mitigative measures. For example, the footnote attached 
to Section 2.3.1.2 in the Marine Policy Statement says of the precautionary approach that 
when ‘risks from an activity are uncertain preventative measures may be required.’
However, a proper interpretation of precautionary management and the more sustain-
able approach would be to require that within all policy and planning decisions, the deci-
sion-makers should anticipate the most extreme—yet still plausible—levels of prejudice 
to long-term social and ecological vectors from a proposed activity (Gullett 1998; Kriebel 
et al. 2001). This also includes, for many, an actual (and not cosmetic) shift in the burden 
of proof to be upon the developer or licence applicants. In many planning decisions and 
policy decisions over the years, therefore, the possibility that UCH might be affected and 
the need to provide a sufficient margin of safety to prevent adverse outcomes has been 
neglected under this heading. For example, during the recent Goodwin Sands case, even 
though the MMO and heritage agencies assured the public that they were adopting pre-
cautionary principles, concerns are still being expressed by many about the proximity of 
dredging activities to potential UCH objects. Effective precautionary management should 
therefore shift the burden more strongly on to developers, to reassure the community that 
effective and powerful protective strategies can be put in place. This might likely include 
a higher proportion of groundtruthing or more detailed consultations on planned mitiga-
tion or avoidance strategies. It would also increase the incentive for developers to more 
thoroughly consider alternative sites or methods, where social and ecological concerns can 
be addressed more effectively (Tickner and Geiser 2004). Adopting such a precautionary 
approach would also pay adherence to other guiding principles for managing common con-
cerns, such as intergenerational equity and sustainable development.
Another guiding principle, for example, could be improved transparency and public 
participation in any decision-making which impacts upon UCH. When heritage agencies 
are requested to provide value assessments to the MMO, DCMS or MOD, or their devolved 
equivalents, there should be much greater thought and attention into how that advice is 
crafted. First, heritage agencies need to be given enough financial resource to carry out 
these assessments effectively on behalf of the regional and international community who 
may possess a greater interest in the site in question. Second, all assessment decisions 
should be fully on the public record (Tenney et al. 2006).
Finally, the method by which heritage value assessments have been made by govern-
ment departments and their advisors needs to be more widely disseminated and understood. 
This would improve the ability of the wider regional community to scrutinise value assess-
ments, as well as to become involved, as much as practicable, with the decision-making 
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processes themselves. Most of all, it would prevent the process from being unfairly 
weighted in favour of developers or those who view UCH recovery as a private enterprise, 
by ensuring the voice of the public and wider community is centre-stage. All of this was 
integral within the Victory (1744) case, where detailed and public scrutiny of MHF’s pro-
posed archaeological project plan was vital in saving the wreck from unnecessary salvage. 
Of course, there is a reasonable counter-argument that such processes need to avoid unnec-
essary bureaucracy and to remain cost-effective and streamlined. However, it is possible for 
an inclusive system to also be balanced and holistic in design, ensuring that public input 
and scrutiny is viewed as a positive and necessary element to achieving efficient and wide-
spread implementation.
Conclusion: A Case for Modernisation and Reform
This paper has sought to provide evidence and establish the case that the UK govern-
ment needs to dedicate more effort, regulation, and resources towards protecting the UK’s 
submerged cultural heritage, before the heritage that remains is further damaged or lost. 
This includes better resourcing for the heritage and other agencies charged with protecting 
UCH, as well as more time and energy being spent on how to more effectively coordinate 
agencies and ensure security in the marine environment. It also includes a comprehensive 
modernisation of legislation, to repeal the harmful elements of the Merchant Shipping Act 
and, in particular, the archaic rules for rewarding the removal of historic wreck. This would 
send a clear message to the public that UCH should start being preserved and enjoyed 
in situ as the first and best option in all cases, except where circumstances demand a pub-
licly supervised and socially-beneficial intervention or removal of heritage. This would 
also anticipate a greater investment in public engagement with the in situ value and means 
for enjoyment of UCH, beyond viewing it as an economic commodity, including a process 
to properly calculate its many recreational, archaeological, historical, cultural, social, and 
existence values.
Further, the UK must adopt a more holistic policy, which is sustainable, precautionary, 
transparent and proportionate. Many changes would also be welcome in terms of underwa-
ter heritage management practice. For example, a culture shift towards a more protective 
outlook towards its impressive maritime cultural record and the value of its UCH, might 
have prevented the UK government from engaging treasure hunters in the Victory (1744), 
Sussex and Gairsoppa cases. Furthermore, a more precautionary, sustainable and cautious 
approach might have created a greater incentive to crafter clearer mitigation strategies or 
consider alternative dredging zones within the Environmental Statement in the Goodwin 
Sands dredging licence application. A higher percentage of groundtruthing of anomalies 
might also have put the public’s mind at ease about the proposed aggregates dredging.
It also must be recognised that the decision taken in the national referendum in June 
2016, to unravel the UK from the European Union (so-called “Brexit”), has led to a sense 
of considerable political instability and economic foreboding. One of the unfortunate 
results is that the tightening constraint on public administration and on the national budget 
appears to be leaving a number of vulnerable policy areas, such as natural and cultural 
heritage protection—which were already at critically under-funded levels—under an even 
graver threat. Indeed, the recent announcement that the urgently needed review of the UK’s 
non-ratification of the UNESCO Convention will be shelved, bears the dishearteningly dis-
tinctive hallmarks of this policy distraction. The decision to hold off the review must be 
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sincerely regretted in the present climate, given that the Convention could effectively pro-
vide the UK with complementary heritage protection through the strengthened preserva-
tion of UCH assets around the world, as well as provide the UK with a valuable role at the 
global UCH policy level (UK UNESCO 2001 Convention Review Group 2014).
If any of the government bodies or agencies responsible for heritage protection in the 
UK are serious about preventing continued damage to the UK’s diminishing UCH, they 
should be vociferous and implacable on ensuring the complete removal of ‘historic’ wreck 
and other UCH from the salvage regime, as well as in the timely ratification of the UNE-
SCO Convention. They should also commence discussion on a detailed and comprehensive 
overhaul of legislation, in order to make it more coherent, proactive, ambitious, globally-
oriented, precautionary, transparent, and enforceable. All of this would resolve the core 
weakness right at the heart of the UK’s policy, which appears to propagate the wisdom that 
UCH is merely an obstacle or pathway to economic advancement, rather than a fundamen-
tally important public resource for perpetual research, remembrance, identity, communal 
engagement and social fulfilment.
Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Chris Underwood, Antony Firth, Bob Yorke, Dan 
Atkinson, and several other esteemed and anonymous colleagues each for their encouraging words and 
valued opinion on various drafts of this paper. The authors would also like to thank the organisers of the 
‘Marine Archaeology: Standards and Practice’ session during the Chartered Institute for Archaeologists 
conference in April 2017 (CIfA 2017). It was following our individual presentations on our research at 
this conference that we were then invited by colleagues to begin producing a joint paper on our research 
findings, which has been in production ever since. All of the research and work which went into this article 
was equally split between both authors and any name ordering is based entirely on mere convenience and 
convention. The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not, in any way, represent those of 
affiliated organisations.
Compliance with Ethical Standards 
Ethical Standards Both authors are members of the Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee. Josh 
Martin is also a member of the Nautical Archaeology Society and Toby Gane of the Chartered Institute for 
Archaeologists. Both authors also work for respective employers, but the opinions expressed herein are solely 
the views of the authors alone and are not at all affiliated with their employing organisations or any of their 
professional colleagues.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
3H Consulting (2018) Site: Goodwin Sands dredging—aircraft found. Plymouth: 3H Consulting Ltd. http://
www.3hcon sulti ng.com/sites /Sites Goodw insAi rcraf t1.html. Accessed July 2019
Anderson R, Philippou C, Harvey P (2006) Innovative approaches in underwater cultural heritage manage-
ment. In: Staniforth M, Nash M (eds) Maritime archaeology: Australian approaches. Springer, New 
York, pp 140–141
Blumberg RC (2005) International protection of underwater cultural heritage. In: Nordquist MH, Moore JN, 
Fu K (eds) Recent developments in the law of the sea and China. Brill, Leiden, pp 491–512
Cadw (2014) Report to the Minister for Natural Resources, Culture and Sport Activity during 2013–14. 
Cadw
CIA (2017) The world fact book. Central Intelligence Agency, McLean
Journal of Maritime Archaeology 
1 3
CIfA (2017) CIfA 2017 Conference. Chartered Institute for Archaeologists, Reading. https ://www.archa 
eolog ists.net/confe rence /2017. Accessed August 2019
Council of Europe (1992) European convention on the protection of the archaeological heritage (Revised). 
Council of Europe (January 1992), Valletta. ETS No. 143
Darrington G (2002) England and Wales: recent issues in maritime archaeology. In: Ruppe CV, Barstad JF 
(eds) International handbook of maritime archaeology. Springer, New York, pp 367–380
DCMS (2005) UK Minister for Department of Culture, Media and Sport in response to Parliamentary ques-
tion. House of Commons Debate: 24th January 2005. Hansard, vol 430, Col. 46W
DCMS (2010) Scheduled monuments. Department for Culture, Media and Sport, London
DCMS (2014) Protection and management of historic military wrecks outside UK Territorial waters: guid-
ance on how existing policies and legislation apply to historic military wreck sites. Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport. April 2014. https ://asset s.publi shing .servi ce.gov.uk/gover nment /uploa ds/
syste m/uploa ds/attac hment _data/file/30796 1/Prote ction _and_Manag ement _of_Histo ric_Milit ary_
Wreck s_outsi de_UK_Terri toria l_Water s__April _2014.pdf. Accessed July 2019
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2009) Our seas—a shared resource: high level marine 
objectives. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, London
Dover Harbour Board (2016a) Goodwin sands aggregate dredging environmental statement—volume 1 non-
technical summary. 16 May 2016. https ://asset s.publi shing .servi ce.gov.uk/gover nment /uploa ds/syste 
m/uploa ds/attac hment _data/file/55235 3/Goodw in_Sands _Aggre gate_Dredg ing_Envir oment al_State 
ment_-_Volum e_I_NTS_Final .pdf. Accessed July 2019
Dover Harbour Board (2016b) Goodwin sands aggregate dredging scheme marine licence application—
further environmental information. 23 Sep 2016.  https ://asset s.publi shing .servi ce.gov.uk/gover nment 
/uploa ds/syste m/uploa ds/attac hment _data/file/55847 4/16092 3_Goodw in_Sands _MLA_Furth er_Envir 
onmen tal_Infor matio n_Final .pdf. Accessed July 2019
Dover Harbour Board (2016c) Goodwin sands aggregate dredging: archaeological written scheme of inves-
tigation.  7 Oct 2016. https ://highs treet deal.co.uk/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/20161 007_Goodw in_Sands 
_Aggre gate_Dredg ing_WSI.pdf. Accessed July 2019
Dover Harbour Board (2017) Goodwin sands aggregate dredging scheme marine licence application—
response to MMO clarification requests.  10 Aug 2017. https ://asset s.publi shing .servi ce.gov.uk/gover 
nment /uploa ds/syste m/uploa ds/attac hment _data/file/63842 9/Goodw in_Sands .pdf. Accessed July 2019
DRASSM (2010) Explore, protect, publicise and study humanity’s drowned history. Ministry of Culture and 
Communications, Paris
Dromgoole S (1989) Protection of historic wreck: the UK approach—part II: towards reform. Int J Estuar 
Coast Law 4:95–116
Dromgoole S (2004) Murky waters for government policy: the case of a 17th century British Warship and 
10 tonnes of gold coins. Mar Policy 28(3):189–198
Dromgoole S (2006a) United Kingdom. In: Dromgoole S (ed) The protection of the underwater cultural 
heritage: national perspectives in light of the UNESCO convention 2001. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 
313–350
Dromgoole S (ed) (2006b) The protection of the underwater cultural heritage: national perspectives in light 
of the UNESCO convention 2001. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden
Dromgoole S (2011) Why the UK should reconsider the UNESCO convention 2001. In: Yorke RA (ed) 
Protection of underwater cultural heritage in international waters adjacent to the UK: proceedings of 
the JNAPC 21st anniversary seminar. Burlington House, November 2010. Joint Nautical Archaeology 
Policy Committee and Nautical Archaeology Society, Portsmouth, pp 23–29
Dromgoole S (2013) Underwater cultural heritage and international law. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge
English Heritage (2004) Marine archaeology legislation project. School of Legal Studies, University of 
Wolverhampton, Wolverhampton
Evans AM, Firth A, Staniforth M (2009) Old and new threats to submerged cultural landscapes: fishing, 
farming and energy development. Conserv Manag Archaeol Sites 11(1):43–53
Firth A (2011) Underwater cultural heritage off England: character and significance. In: Yorke RA (ed) 
Protection of underwater cultural heritage in international waters adjacent to the UK: proceedings of 
the JNAPC 21st anniversary seminar. Burlington House, November 2010. Joint Nautical Archaeology 
Policy Committee and Nautical Archaeology Society, Portsmouth, pp 15–22
Firth A (2014) UK Safeguarding of underwater cultural heritage: factual background. Unpublished briefing 
paper for BA/HFF Steering Committee on Underwater Cultural Heritage. Fjordr Ref: 16200. Fjordr 
Limited, Tisbury
Firth A (2015) Social and economic benefits of marine and maritime cultural heritage. Fjordr Ltd for Honor 
Frost Foundation, London
 Journal of Maritime Archaeology
1 3
Flatman J (2007) The origins and ethics of maritime archaeology—Part II. Public Archaeol 6(3):141–154
Flatman J (2012) What the walrus and the carpenter did not talk about: maritime archaeology and the near 
future of energy. In: Rockman M, Flatman J (eds) Archaeology in society: its relevance in the modern 
world. Springer, New York, pp 167–192
Fletcher-Tomenius P, Forrest C (2000) Historic wreck in international waters: conflict or consensus? Mar 
Policy 24(1):1–10
Flint RW (2013) Practice of sustainable community development: a participatory framework for change. 
Springer, New York
Forrest C (2009) Historic wreck salvage: an international perspective. Tulane Marit Law J 33(2):347–379
Garabello R, Scovazzi T (eds) (2003) The protection of the underwater cultural heritage: before and after 
the 2001 convention. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden
González AW, O’Keefe PJ, Williams M (2009) The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Under-
water Cultural Heritage: a future for our past? Conserv Manag Archaeol Sites 11(1):54–69
Gribble J, Parham D, Scott-Ireton D (2009) Historic wrecks: risks or resources? Conserv Manag Archaeol 
Sites 11(1):16–28
Gullett W (1998) Environmental impact assessment and the precautionary principle: legislating caution in 
environmental protection. Aust J Environ Manag 5(3):146–158
Hall JL (2011) Things, Inc: a case for in  situ application. In: Harris JW (ed) Maritime law: issues, chal-
lenges and implications (laws and legislation). Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, pp 27–52
Henderson G (2001) Significance assessment or blanket protection? Int J Naut Archaeol 30(2):3–4
Heritage Lottery Fund (2017). Evaluation: good practice guidance. HLF web-published document. http://
www.hlf.org.uk/evalu ation -guida nce. Accessed 4 June 2019
Historic England (2016a) Heritage counts 2016: heritage and the economy. Historic England, Swindon
Historic England (2016b) Three year corporate plan, 2016–19. Historic England, Swindon
Historic England (2017) Three year corporate plan 2017–2020. Historic England, Swindon
Historic England (2018) Heritage and the economy 2018. Historic England, Swindon
Historic Environment Scotland (2016) Policy statement June 2016. HES, Edinburgh
House of Lords (2001) UK Parliamentary Debates 31 October 2001. Hansard, volume 627: paras 1491-
1506. https ://api.parli ament .uk/histo ric-hansa rd/lords /2001/oct/31/natio nal-herit age-bill-hl. Accessed 
25 Apr 2019
ISU (2017) International Salvage Union. http://www.marin e-salva ge.com. Accessed 4 June 2019
Jing Y, Li J (2019) Who owns underwater cultural heritage in the South China Sea. Coast Manag 
47(1):107–126
Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee (1989) Heritage at Sea: proposals for the better protection 
of archaeological sites underwater. JNAPC, York. http://www.jnapc .org.uk/Herit age%20at%20Sea .pdf. 
Accessed July 2019
Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee (2000) Heritage law at sea 2000. JNAPC, York. http://www.
jnapc .org.uk/Herit age%20Law %20at%20Sea %20200 0.pdf. Accessed July 2019
Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee (2003) An interim report on the valletta convention and her-
itage law at sea. JNAPC, York. http://www.jnapc .org.uk/Valle tta%20Con venti on%20&%20HL%20
at%20Sea .pdf. Accessed July 2019
Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee (2006) JNAPC code of practice for seabed development. 
JNAPC, York. http://www.jnapc .org.uk/jnapc _broch ure_may_2006.pdf. Accessed July 2019
Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee (2010) ‘HMS Victory 1744: options for the management 
of the wreck site—a public consultation by the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport: Response by the Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee’, June 2010. JNAPC, 
York. http://www.jnapc .org.uk/HMSVi ctory -Respo nse-JNAPC -June-2010.pdf. Accessed July 2019
Kriebel D, Tickner J, Epstein P, Lemons J, Levins R, Loechler EL, Quinn M, Rudel R, Schettler T, Stoto M 
(2001) The precautionary principle in environmental science. Environ Health Perspect 109(9):871–876
Letter from Lord Lingfield to Michael Fallon MP (2014) Dated 25 July 2014. Obtained by FOI request and 
on file with the authors
Lowther J, Glover R, Williams M (2008) Salvage, pollution or looting? The stranding of the Napoli’s cargo. 
J Water Law 19(3):98–119
Maarleveld TJ (2006) Netherlands. In: Dromgoole S (ed) The protection of underwater cultural heritage: 
national perspectives in light of the UNESCO convention 2001. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 161–188
Manson NA (2002) Formulating the precautionary principle. Environ Ethics 24(3):263–274
McCartney I (2017) The Battle of Jutland’s Heritage under threat: commercial salvage on the shipwrecks as 
observed 2000 to 2016. The Mariner’s Mirror 103(2):196–204
MMO (2018) Environmental impact assessment consent decision and decision report—aggregate extrac-
tion Area 521—Goodwin Sands MLA/2016/00227. 25 July 2018. Marine Management Organisation, 
Journal of Maritime Archaeology 
1 3
Newcastle. https ://asset s.publi shing .servi ce.gov.uk/gover nment /uploa ds/syste m/uploa ds/attac hment 
_data/file/72960 1/20180 725_EIA_Conse nt_Decis ion_and_Decis ion_Repor t.pdf. Accessed July 2019
Nafziger JAR (1999) The titanic revisited. Tulane J Marit Law Commer 30:311–329
Northern Ireland Environment Agency (2016) NIEA business plan 2016–17, NIEA. https ://www.daera -ni.
gov.uk/publi catio ns/niea-busin ess-plan-2016-17. Accessed 4 June 2019
O’Keefe PJ (2014) Shipwrecked heritage: a commentary on the UNESCO convention on underwater cul-
tural heritage, 2nd edn. Institute of Art and Law, Leicester
Parham D, Underwood C, Rhynas Brown R (2013) British Postal Packet Hanover, 1757: salvage and archae-
ology. Int J Naut Archaeol 42(2):403–438
Pearce CJ (2010) Cornish wrecking, 1700–1860: reality and popular myth. Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge
Ransley J, Satchell J (2014) Anarchic archives: the potency and problems of maritime archaeological 
archives. Archaeol Rev From Camb 29(2):181–197
Rednap M (1990) The Albion and Hindstan: the fate of two outward-bound East Indiamen. Int J Naut 
Archaeol Underw Explor 19(1):23–30
Roberts H (2018) The British ratification of the underwater heritage convention: problems and prospects. Int 
Comp Law Q 67(4):833–865
Schoenbaum TJ (2012) Admiralty and maritime law, 5th edn. West Academic, St. Paul
Slaper TF, Hall TJ (2011) The triple bottom line: what is it and how does it work? Indiana Bus Rev 
86(1):4–8
Stewart RB (2002) Environmental regulatory decision making under uncertainty. In: Zerbe RO, Swanson T 
(eds) An introduction to the law and economics of environmental policy: issues in institutional design. 
Emerald Insight Publishers Ltd., Bingley, pp 71–126
Strati A (1995) The protection of underwater cultural heritage: an emerging objective of the contemporary 
law of the sea. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden
Tenney A, Kværner J, Gjerstad KI (2006) Uncertainty in environmental impact assessment predictions: the 
need for better communication and more transparency. Impact Assess Proj Apprais 24(1):45–56
The Crown Estate (2010) Protocol for archaeological discoveries: offshore renewables projects. Wessex 
Archaeology, Salisbury. https ://www.thecr ownes tate.co.uk/media /14896 4/ei-proto col-for-archa eolog 
ical-disco verie s-offsh ore-renew ables -proje cts.pdf. Accessed July 2019
Tickner JA, Geiser K (2004) The precautionary principle stimulus for solutions- and alternatives-based 
environmental policy. Environ Impact Assess Rev 24(7–8):801–824
Tomalin DJ, Simpson P, Bingeman JM (2000) Excavation versus sustainability in  situ: a conclusion on 
25 years of archaeological investigations at goose rock, a designated historic wreck-site at the needles, 
isle of wight, England. Int J Naut Archaeol 29(1):3–42
UK Government (2011) UK marine policy statement. HM Government, London. https ://www.gov.uk/gover 
nment /uploa ds/syste m/uploa ds/attac hment _data/file/69322 /pb365 4-marin e-polic y-state ment-11031 
6.pdf. Accessed July 2019
UK Government (2015) Joint spending review and autumn statement 25 November 2015. HMG, London
UK National Commission for UNESCO (2015) UNESCO convention on the protection of underwater cul-
tural heritage: next steps for the UK Government. UK National Commission for UNESCO Secretariat, 
London
UK Parliament (2017) Underwater cultural heritage. Written statement from the parliamentary under-secre-
tary of state for digital, culture, media and sport (John Glen). 31 Oct 2017. Hansard HCWS208. http://
hansa rd.parli ament .uk/commo ns/2017-10-31/debat es/17103 12800 0011/Under water Cultu ralHe ritag e. 
Accessed July 2019
UK UNESCO 2001 Convention Review Group (2014) The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001: an impact review for the United Kingdom. http://www.jnapc .org.
uk/UNESC O%20Imp act%20Rev iew%20Feb ruary %20201 4.pdf. Accessed July 2019
UNESCO (1997) Report by the director-general on the findings of the meeting of experts concerning the 
preparation of an international instrument for the protection of the underwater cultural heritage. UN 
Doc: 151 EX/10. UNESCO, Paris
UNESCO (2001) UNESCO convention on the protection of underwater cultural heritage. UNESCO, Paris 
(November 2001). 2562 UNTS 1
United Nations (1982) United Nations convention on the law of the sea. United Nations, Montego Bay 
(December 1982). 1833 UNTS 396
Varmer O (1999) The case against the “salvage” of the cultural heritage. J Marit Law Commer 
30(2):279–302
Weiss EB (2015) Nature and law: the global commons and the common concern of humankind. In: 
Dasgupta PS, Ramanathan V, Minnerath R (eds) Sustainable humanity, sustainable nature, our 
 Journal of Maritime Archaeology
1 3
responsibility—the proceedings of the joint workshop on 2–6 May 2014. Pontificiae Academiae Scien-
tiarvm Extra Series 41. The Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Vatican City
Wilkins B (2012) Where the rubber hits the road: a critical analysis of archaeological decision making on 
highways projects in Ireland. In: Cobb H, Harris O, Jones C, Richardson P (eds) Reconsidering archae-
ological fieldwork: exploring on-site relationships between theory and practice. Springer, New York, 
pp 53–66
Wiswall FL (1970) The development of admiralty jurisdiction and practice since 1800. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our common future. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and 
institutional affiliations.
